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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JOHN IRA BAER,
Plaintiff and avpellant,
vs.

Case No.
12055

GAIL YOUNG,
Defendant and respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a suit by a husband against the wife's alleged
paramour, claiming damages for alienation of affection
and criminal conversation.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Decree were entered by the lower court on the 15th day
of September 1969, rendering judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant in the amount of $25,000
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and reciting, that "defendant having failed and refused
to appear, did not appear, and his default was entered."
(R. 13-15)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mrs. Gail Young was served a summons and complaint on the 17th day of April at her home. (R. 8)
The defendant, Gail Young, did not live at that
residence with his wife, but was rather residing at the
home of plaintiff, and resided there from January 25,
until June 10. (R. Page 46, line 12, R. 11)
1

•The defendant subsequently somehow did obtain a
summons and complaint and had the same in his possession at a hearing held before Judge Anderson on
May 28, 1969 as evidenced by the following language
found on page 66 of the record, lines 8-19:

"Q.

Now, immediately after the hearing, Mr.
Young, didn't you come up to me with a summons and complaint in this very action and
hand it to me an say, "Look, my time is up;
what should I do with this?" Now, did you
or didn't you?

A.

I think this was on the one that - yes, one
I brought in; this was your "show cause";
right.
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Q.

But you had a
this action, did
time is up now,
correct - right

summons and complaint in
you not, and you said, "My
what should I do" Isn't that
in the courtroom?

THE COURT: Judge Anderson's courtroom?
Q.

Judge Anderson's courtroom; do you recall
that?

A.

I think so, yes.

All other facts stated by the plaintiff-appellant are
immaterial to this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT'S
ESTRANGED WIFE AT A HOME WHERE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT RESIDING, DID NOT CONSTITUTE GOOD
SERVICE UPON THE DEFENDANT UNDER APPLICABLE
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCED-

URE.

Plaintiff-appellant has misquoted Rule 4( e) (1) in his
brief, and that Rule is correctly quoted as follows:
" ( e) Personal Service in this State. Personal
service within the State shall be as follows:
(1) Upon a natural person of the age
of 14 years or over, by delivering a copy
thereof to him personally, or by leaving such
copy at his usual place of abode with some
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person of suitable age and discretion there
residing; or by delivering a copy to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
The primary issue in this case is ·whether or not
the service of process was made at the usual place of
abode of the defendant.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, it is very
clear that the defendant was not a the time living at tlw
address where the service of smmnons was made, and
had not befm living then• for over two months.
A fundamental distinction has been made in this
State between the notion of residence and usual place
of abode, the latter term being defined as the place at
which one is actually living. This distinction was made
by Justice Wolfe in Booth v. Crockett, 110 Utah 363,
173 P.2d 647 (Utah 1946). The following language is
extensively quoted from that case, because of its relevance and applicability:
"The recent cases of Kurilla v. Roth, August,
1944, 132 N.J .L. 213, 38 A.2d 862, 8G-!, and McFadden v. Shore, D.C., .March 19-!5 GO F.Supp. 8, 9,
involved fact situations indistinguishable in legal
effect from the original case here.
The New Jersey court in the Kurilla
said in part:
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"'Abode' is one's fixed place of residence
for the time being - the place where a person
dwells. One's 'usual place of abode,' in the statutory view, is the place where one is 'actually living' at the time when service is made."
"Of course, a person may enter one of the
armed services under conditions that permit him
to retain his preexisting place of abode within
the meaning of this Act; but such is not the case
here. Upon defendant's induction into the armed
forces, his mother's home ceased instanter to be
his place of abode. It does not matter in this
regard that some of his clothing and personal
belongings remain there, or that he intends to
return to his mother's home, wherever it may he,
as soon as his military SE~rvice is terminated.
\Vhile filial love binds him to his mother wherever
she may be, and her home is his for lack of
another, it is no longer his 'actual place of abode'
within the intendment of the statuh•."
The New Jersey court ordered the service
quashed.
McFadden v. Shore, supra, was decided by
a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania. The
court held the defendant's "usual residence" was
his usual place of abode' and held substituted
service made by leaving the copy of the summons
at the home of the sailor defendants parents.
This court in Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah
450, 108 P. 931, 933, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 280, interpreted the phrase "usual place of abode" and
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gave it the restricted meaning given by the New
Jersey court in the l(urilla case. In the Lawrence
case this court said:
"Usual place of ah ode is sometimes ref erred
to as being synonymous withd omicile or permanent residence. In our judgment there is a broad
distinction between domicile and usual plaee of
abode as the latter term is used in our statute.
Such also sel'UlS to be the conclusion reached b>the authorities, as is demonstrated b>- the follmring cases: In Mygatt v. Coe, G3 N.J. L 510, 51~,
44 A. 198, 199, the Supreme Court of N e\Y Jersey,
in construing a statute authorizing substituted
serviee in terms similar to ours says:
" 'The Statute do<>s not din_•ct servict' to lJe
made, at the "residence" of the defendant, hut
at his dwelling house or usual plaee of abode,
which is a much more restricted term. As was
said in Stout v. Leonard, 37 N.J.L. 492, many
persons have several residences which they permanently maintain, occupying one at one pt>riod
of the year and one at another period. vVhere
such conditions exist, a summons must be serv("d
at the dwelling house in which the defendant is
living at the time when service is made.'"
The court \Yt>nt on to say:
"After departing for naval s0rvice, Frank';.;
ordinary activities of living wen• no longPr eentered around the Fairbanks home. He no longer
usually ate or slept there. He was no longer
usually physically prc>st>nt at the home or shortly
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expected. His duties required him to be at his
station, which at the time the copy of the summons was left at the hame, was at a navy hase
in another state. 'rhe facts that many of his 1wrsonal possessions rc>maint>d at the home and that
the ties of blood and affection continued and that
he frequently corresponded with versom; at the
home are to be considered in determining where
he was "living," but in this case those facts are
greatly outweighed by his physical departure from
the place for the purpose of undertaking naval
duty at a distant base for apparf>ntly an irnlefinite period. \Ve think it clear that Frank Fairbanks was not "living" at the Fairbanks home
when the copy of tJu:. smmnom; was lPft then'.

vV e do not nwan that \Yhen a person

fh•1iarts

from his usual place of abodP h'rnporarily for
lms1ness, pleasure or cultural purpost>s lw has
ceased living at his usual place of abode. Livingat a place does not 11wan that a iwrson must lw
always there. But if the hrPak in the continuity
of his acivities which constitute living a wlwt
was his home is so marked, such as an indefinited
tenure of military or any duty away from that
home or a departure for a prolonged though definite term of study or where he has distinctly
taken up a new station for business purpos0s,
even though he may have his helongings at his
former place of abode or keep in close co1Tespondential touch with it, tlH~ place where he lived
would be not his present usual place of abode, but
a former place of abode. Such a marked severance with the place at whirh he abided me:.rns that
he no longer usually abides there." ...
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"From the facts and circumstances of this
case, we hold the Fairbanks home was not Frank
Fairbanks' "usual place of abode" on December
13, 1945, and that therefore, Judge Crockett ruled
correctly in granting the motion to quash service
in the original case.''
The court, in the foregoing case also found that the
fact that the defendant has actually been adivsed of
the suit and had actually received notice of the summons
from his parents did not change the fact that the initial
attempted service was void.

Grant v. Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931, stated
as follows:
"The statute does not direct service to he
made at the 'residence' of the defendant, but at
his dwelling house or usual place of abode, which
is a much more restricted term. As was said in
Stout v. Leonard, 37 N.J. Law, 492, many persons
have several residences which they permanently
maintain, occupying one at one period of the year
and another at another period. Where such conditions exist, a summons must be served at the
dwelling house in which the defendant is libingat the time when the service is made." That is,
where a person abides - lives - at the particular
time when the summons is served, constitutPs his
usual place of abode."
We see therefore that the courts in construing the
question have vt>ry narrowly limited the application of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
the statute in order to give the defendant an opportunity
to be heard in court.
POINT TWO
THE APPEARANCE OF THE DEFENDANT BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ALDON J. ANDERSON DID NOT CONSTITUTE A GENERAL APPEARANCE IN THE ACTION
WHICH SUBJECTED HIM TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT FOR THE PURPOSE OF RENDERING PERSONAL
JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM.

The defendant appeared pursuant to the order of
thP court that he appear, of which order he received
actual notice.
The defendant Gail Young howevt>r should not be
pPnalized for appearing voluntarily for the hearing on
the isue as to whether or not he should be required to
remove himself from the home of Kayla Baer.
The only issue resolved at that hearing was the
question of his removal, and he was ordered by the court
to so remove himeslf, and complied with that order.
As was stated under point one in the quotation from
the case of Booth v. Crockett, the fact that the defendant
may have actually received the complaint does not make
valid an initially void service.
The case of Sorensen v. Sorensrn, 18 Utah 2nd 102,
417 Pacific 2nd 118, cited by appellant, is clearly not
in point, for in that case the party who contended that
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there . was no justification m the court had answered
and filed a counterclaim.
"So: Mother says the lower court had no
jurisdiction because father didn't serve her with
summons within the time prescribed by Rule 4(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Up until this
time service seems to have been satisfactory.
She would be correct under the rule except
she counter-claimed, sought relief, got part of
that for which she asked, and now complains that
with all this she should receive the benefits of
the lower court's decision but not the bitter fruits
thereof ... "
The defendant in this case has not requested any
relief of the court prior to his motion to set aside the
judgment for the reason of lack of jurisdiction over his
person.
The mere physical presence of a party or his attorney in the court room during some phase of the proceeding does not constitute the entry of an appearance.
5 American Jurisprudence 2d, Appearance, Section 17,
page 493, also see Smith v. Gadd (Ky) 280 SW2d 495;
Fulton v. Ramsey, 67 W. Va. 321, 68 SE 381; Honeycutt
v. Nyquist, P. & Co., 12 vVyo. 183, 74 P. 90.
The relief sought in the order to show cause was
similar to or would have resulted in a contempt proceed-
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ing. In that regard, see 5 American Jurisprudence 2d,
Section 33, at page 507, which states as follows:
"Similarily, an appearance in response to a
contempt rule, and the actual purging of the contempt by compliance with the order of the court,
does no constitue an appearance in the action
in which the order was entered.''
The lower court did not make a finding that Judge
Anderson's hearing constituted a general appearance on
behalf of the defendant at the time of the default, nor
was any evidence offered in that regard at the default
hearing but rather, jurisdiction over the default was
found based upon the service of the summons upon the
defendant's wife. (R. 12-14) 'The decree specifically provides defendant "did not appear." (R. 12)
POINT THREE
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RENDERING ITS DECISION AFTER THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL HAD BEEN
DISMISSED FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

The appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on
the 26th day of February, 1970. (R. 31)

The order

setting aside the judgment was entered March 23, 1970.
(R. 36) Therefore, the lower court clearly had jurisdiction to enter the judgment when it did based upon the
record before that.
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POINT FOUR
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS IMPROPERLY INCLUDED MATTERS IN ITS BRIEF WHICH ARE NOT REFLECTED BY THE RECORD.

The plaintiff-appellant states m his conclusion as
follows:
"Defendant readily admits that all allegations of the Complaint are true. He has further
intentionally failed to answer and, in open Court
acknowledged that Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law are accurate."
It is improper for the defendant-appellant to include

such an allegation in his brief, for nowhere in the record
does the defendant readily admit that all allegations
of the complaint are true. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah
2d 406, 385 Pac. 2d 154.
CONCLUSION

1

The presumptions which rest in favor of affirming
the lower court and in favor of allowing the defendantrespondent to have his case tried upon the merits and
the obvious inequities appearing from the records should
in view of the law lead the court to conclude that the
service was void, that the defndant did not make a
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general appearance, submitting himself to jurisdiction,
and that the lowPr court was not precluded from hearing the motion to S(~t aside the judgment.
Respectfull~r

submitted,

SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE
& COHNE
By: Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney for the Dr,fendantRespondent

1010 University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 364-7737
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